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PREDICTING COURT OUTCOMES
THROUGH POLITICAL PREFERENCES:
THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT
AND THE CHAOS OF 1993
J. MARK RAMSEYER†
ABSTRACT
Empiricists routinely explain politically sensitive decisions of the
U.S. federal courts through the party of the executive or legislature
appointing the judge. That they can do so reflects the fundamental
independence of the courts. After all, appointment politics will predict
judicial outcomes only when judges are independent of sitting
politicians. Because Japanese Supreme Court justices enjoy an
independence similar to that of U.S. federal judges, I use judicial
outcomes to ask whether Japanese premiers from different parties
have appointed justices with different political preferences.
Although the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan
for most of the postwar period, it temporarily lost power in the mid1990s. Elsewhere, Professor Eric Rasmusen and I asked whether the
administration of the lower courts changed during this non-LDP
hiatus. Here, I explore whether the supreme court changed. More
specifically, I ask whether the non-LDP premiers appointed supreme
court justices with different policy preferences. I find that they did not.

INTRODUCTION
In universities, scholars try hard to understand why judges decide
cases the way they do. In the United States, we find that (in some
subsets of cases) we can predict the way federal judges decide cases
through proxies for their political preferences. Most obviously,
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sometimes we can predict their decisions through the party of their
1
appointing president or legislature.
These studies work because federal judges are independent and
human. In conducting them, we use standard social scientific tools.
And social science explains how judges act because it concerns human
behavior—and judges are, after all, human beings. As Judge Richard
Posner put it, they are “all-too-human workers, responding as other
workers do to the conditions of the labor market in which they
2
3
work.” In a 1993 essay, Posner asked, what do judges maximize? We
in the academy may disagree about the details, but few of us would
4
quarrel with his bottom line: the same thing everybody else does.
Others have sometimes been less sympathetic. When Professor
Richard Revesz used the party of the appointing president to predict
5
voting patterns on the D.C. Circuit, Judge Harry Edwards declared
war: it was time to “refute the heedless observations of academic
6
scholars who misconstrue and misunderstand the work of . . . judges.”
When Professors Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller characterized
7
dissenting judges as whistleblowers, he dismissed their piece as an
8
“absurd” bit “of sheer speculation.”
But perhaps the D.C. judge doth protest too much. And perhaps
he also misses a bit of the point. Scholars like Professors Revesz,
Cross and Tiller can predict judicial votes through political variables
1. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 219, 217–22 (2002) (discussing “the impact of presidential
regimes on the Court’s behavior”); Tracey E. George, Developing a Positive Theory of
Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635, 1651 (1998) (“[S]ocial
scientists have discovered that the political party of the appointing President is a good proxy for
a justice’s attitudes.”); Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee Epstein, The Median Justice
on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1285–87 (2005) (discussing “[t]he use
of political party to identify the median Justice”); Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover,
Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557,
559–62 (1989) (using newspaper editorials to measure judges’ values and then finding a
correlation between those values and Supreme Court votes).
2. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 7 (2008).
3. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1993).
4. Id.
5. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1717, 1718–19 (1997).
6. Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1335, 1335 (1998).
7. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal
Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2159 (1998).
8. Edwards, supra note 6, at 1337.
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precisely because of the fundamental independence of the federal
courts. Were courts not independent of sitting politicians, judges
could not costlessly indulge their political biases. And if they could
not indulge them at low cost, they would not indulge them often. That
they act politically in political cases simply reflects their essential
independence from incumbent politicians.
I hesitate to stress the point more strongly. One thoughtful
reader of an earlier draft described the point as “old hat.” All sensible
legal scholars know this, he assured me. I take his point. Rather than
push the point further, I simply use it to ask how aggressively leftist
Japanese politicians tried to assert control over the courts during their
time in power in the mid-1990s.
9
Unlike their lower-court colleagues, Japanese Supreme Court
justices enjoy politically independent careers. Once appointed, they
serve until age seventy—and effectively face no incentives tied to
10
their incomes, wealth, or careers. Accordingly, I use their opinions
to explore the way Japanese politicians try (or do not try) to assert
control over the courts.
For this exercise, I turn to the few short years in the mid-1990s
when three reformist prime ministers briefly broke the hold of what
had been the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). To ask whether
these three tried to transform the courts, I ask whether the justices
they appointed wrote different opinions from LDP appointees.
Because politicians primarily control the Japanese lower courts

9. For discussion of the political management of Japanese lower courts, see generally J.
MARK RAMSEYER & ERIC B. RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF JUDGING IN JAPAN (2003) [hereinafter RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN,
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Political
Uncertainty’s Effect on Judicial Recruitment and Retention: Japan in the 1990s, 35 J. COMP.
ECON. 329 (2007) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect]; J. Mark
Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case for Managed Judges: Learning from Japan After the
Political Upheaval of 1993, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1879 (2006) [hereinafter Ramseyer & Rasmusen,
Case for Managed Judges]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Are Japanese Judges
So Conservative in Politically Charged Cases?, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 331 (2001) [hereinafter
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the
Japanese Conviction Rate So High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53 (2001) [hereinafter Ramseyer &
Rasmusen, Japanese Conviction Rate]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why the
Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 571 (1999) [hereinafter Ramseyer &
Rasmusen, Japanese Taxpayer]; J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence
in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259 (1997) [hereinafter
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Judicial Independence].
10. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50.
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11

through the supreme court, a premier who hoped to change the
courts would have stacked the supreme court with justices who shared
his reformist instincts. Those instincts, in turn, would have reflected a
different set of policy preferences from those of the LDP appointees.
Given the institutional independence of the supreme court, those
different policy preferences would have been observable in the
opinions the justices wrote. Were they?
I begin by discussing the ties between career incentives and
judicial independence (Part I). I explain Japanese court structure
(Parts II and III), and the political turmoil of 1993 (Part IV). I
conclude by testing whether the LDP and reformist justices wrote
different opinions (Part V).
I. INDEPENDENCE
A. Within Markets
Few scholars would try to use ideological or political variables to
predict the way corporate CEOs run their businesses. It is not that
CEOs do not hold strong preferences. Like most humans, they hold
preferences over a wide range of issues. And like most, they bring
these preferences to their jobs.
Nonetheless, scholars seldom try to use ideological or political
preferences to explain the way CEOs do their jobs. Even when CEOs
hold such preferences over precise issues a business faces, scholars
ignore them. They ignore them because they do not matter: the
preferences do not explain much that CEOs do.
The reason is simple—CEOs operate under market constraints.
There are exceptions, to be sure. Environmentalist executives may
locate politically congenial careers in “green” technologies. Leftist
financiers may market “social choice” mutual funds. Religiously
driven managers may run church nonprofits.
Yet within most industries, market competition prevents
executives from much indulging their ideological and political biases.
Ultimately, CEOs run their firms within the confines of capital, labor,
and service and product markets. If they choose a strategy for
ideological rather than economic reasons, they risk losing customers.

11. For a discussion of these mechanisms, see supra Part II.B. Note, however, that
politicians could refuse to confirm lower-court judges at the end of their ten-year terms.
Saibansho ho [Court Act], art. 40(3). This is rarely observed. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN,
MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 8.
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Left on their own, they risk running their firm out of business.
Fundamentally, incumbent CEOs do not maximize economic returns
because they “believe” in those returns more strongly than they
believe in ideology or politics. They maximize economic returns
because competitive markets weed them out if they do anything else.
B. Within Institutions
Scholars find politics similarly irrelevant within tightly run
organizations. Even in organizations insulated from economic
markets, scholars may find employee political preferences mostly
beside the point. Take a think tank owned by Party A. A maintains
the institute to promote its own policies. It does not want its research
staff using it to promote the policies of rival Party B.
Given this environment, institute employees who championed
anything other than Party A policies would find themselves at a dead
end. In general, the institute would not promote them as rapidly as
their peers. It would not pay them as generously. Should they
complete a study that recommended Party B policies, it would tend
not to publish it. Whatever private preferences these employees
might hold, their published work will tend to endorse A’s policies.
Even scholars who knew the employees’ private preferences would
seldom find them relevant.
Crucial to this equilibrium is Party A’s power potentially to
12
intervene in internal institute affairs. A will actually intervene in
matters only occasionally, and only when it needs to demonstrate its
power and control. For as long as A can intervene, it will not need
actually to do so. Rather than risk A’s punishment, incumbent
employees will promote A’s positions on their own. Incumbent
employees would likely not hire an outspoken Party B follower who
applies for work. Knowing that A had the power to intervene in
personnel matters, few B partisans would bother applying for the job
anyway. They realize the institute will tend not to promote them, not
to pay them well, and not to publish the studies they write. Rather
than apply to the institute, they will opt for more gratifying work
elsewhere.

12. See Randall L. Calvert, Mark J. Moran & Barry R. Weingast, Congressional Influence
over Policy Making: The Case of the FTC, in CONGRESS: STRUCTURE AND POLICY 493, 514–17
(Mathew D. McCubbins & Terry Sullivan eds., 1987).
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C. Within Courts
1. Independence. Political preferences explain judicial decisions
in the U.S. federal courts precisely because—by Constitution, by
statute, and by custom—politicians have insulated them from the
usual “high-powered” incentives that CEOs and think-tank
employees face. Federal judges can decide cases as they please, and
suffer no ill effect. Suppose they write an opinion that displeases the
president or the Chief Justice or the attorney general or the Speaker
of the House. They will not earn a lower salary. They will not miss a
13
promotion, or find their opinions denied publication. Their court is
even less likely to go out of business. Precisely because politicians do
14
not punish a judge for indulging private preferences, a scholar can
sometimes use those preferences to predict how a judge will decide.
2. Dependence. By contrast, suppose a powerful politician (say,
the prime minister in a parliamentary government) controlled the
courts more closely. Suppose he hired subordinates to monitor the
way judges behave. Suppose he controlled resources (like pay scale
assignments) that judges valued. And suppose he used the control to
promote personal political preferences.
Within this judicial environment, scholars could seldom predict
judicial behavior through judicial preferences. In this environment,
heterodox judges who indulged their private preferences would find
their careers stalled. They might not be appointed to prestigious
posts. They might find their salaries frozen. They might not see their
opinions published. Realizing the potential cost of heterodoxy, most
such judges would keep their preferences to themselves. And
contemplating a life of enforced compliance, many more heterodox
jurists would opt for life in the private bar instead.
As a result, a judge’s political preferences will help predict
judicial decisions only when politicians keep the courts independent

13. U.S. judges, however, are not indifferent to the possibility of being appointed to a more
prestigious court. See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Explaining Judicial Behavior or What’s
“Unconstitutional” About the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 183, 193 (1991)
(finding evidence “consistent with the hypothesis that judges are more likely to follow the
Administration’s wishes when facing the prospect of a promotion to an appeals court position”).
14. For a discussion of why U.S. politicians find it advantageous to do so, see TOM
GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN ASIAN
CASES 21–33 (2003); F. Andrew Hanssen, Is There a Politically Optimal Level of Judicial
Independence?, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 712, 712 (2004); J. Mark Ramseyer, The Puzzling
(In)dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 721, 741–42 (1994).
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of themselves. Should politicians do so, a judge will find it relatively
costless to decide cases according to private preferences. In the
routine business of court decisionmaking, he will seldom focus on
those preferences. After all, few judges hold heterodox beliefs
(whatever those might be) about traffic accident or consumer debt
claims. In the unusual but politically newsworthy cases of
constitutional moment, however, judges may indeed disagree with
each other about how to decide a case. Those disagreements, in turn,
will track their private political preferences.
Hence the moral: where politicians keep the courts independent,
court outcomes will tend to track private judicial preferences; where
politicians do not do so, those private preferences simply will not
matter.
II. THE JAPANESE LOWER COURTS

15

A. The Incentives
Remarkably closely, this account of the Party A think tank
captures the internal dynamics of the Japanese lower courts. For most
of the past half-century, the courts recruited their lower-court judges
from (what was until recently) the sole national law school, the Legal
Research & Training Institute (LRTI). In a typical year, they hired
16
seventy to one hundred new judges. These men and women (in 1998,
17
81 percent were still men) then served a series of renewable ten-year
18
terms. The courts almost always renewed those terms, and most
judges quit a few years before the mandatory retirement age of sixty19
five.

15. I take the general description below from RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 7–25. For an alternative (but largely consistent)
general description, see generally John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity,
Autonomy, and the Public Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed.,
2007).
16. See ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN [OVERVIEW OF CAREERS OF ALL JUDGES]
(Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai ed., 4th ed. 2004) (collecting data on all judges, by year).
17. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1886 tbl.3.
18. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 8.
19. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 50 (setting the mandatory
retirement age at sixty-five); J. MARK RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH,
JAPAN’S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE 154 tbl.8.1 (1993) (demonstrating the practice of early
retirement).
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During their careers, lower-court judges moved from post to post
20
and city to city, usually at three-year intervals. Some posts carried
more prestige than others. Among the most coveted were those with
administrative power: chief judgeships, for example, or positions in
the judicial administrative headquarters known as the Supreme Court
21
Secretariat. Among the least desirable were the branch offices and
22
family courts.
Similarly, some cities offered more appeal than others. Like
other professionals, most Japanese judges preferred to live in the
23
urban centers. There, they found the best preparatory schools for
24
their children and the greatest amenities for themselves. Among
those centers, most judges preferred Tokyo, if not Tokyo then Osaka,
25
and if not Osaka then one of the regional centers. Should a Tokyo
judge find himself posted to a small town, he typically left his family
26
in Tokyo. He moved there alone, and then prayed for a
reassignment to Tokyo three years hence.
And some judges earned more than others, even more than
others of the same age. Granted, Article 80 of the Constitution
declares that “judges of the inferior courts shall receive . . . adequate
27
compensation which shall not be decreased.” But to protect against
pay cuts is one thing. To guarantee uniform increases is quite another.
Subject to minor qualifications, all U.S. federal judges on the courts
of appeals earn the same pay. As life-long employees, Japanese
28
judges do not. They start their careers at low pay. If they climb the
pay scale rapidly they will in time earn attractive salaries, but the
Constitution does not guarantee a rapid climb. By controlling the
pace at which they climb the scale, the courts can use the highest of
the high-powered incentives to control the way their judges behave.

20. RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 156.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 11.
24. Id. at 11–12.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 12.
27. KENPÕ, art. 80.
28. For the pay scale as of the late 1980s, see RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19,
at 155 tbl.8.2.
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B. Control
1. Administrative Ties. Decisions about which judge to post in
which position to which city at what pay grade are controlled by the
29
judges in the Secretariat. These judges too hold standard lower-court
appointments and serve in the Secretariat for the standard three-year
term—but the Secretariat is not a standard post. Instead, it is among
the fairest posts of them all. Judges named to the Secretariat are
judges in a hurry. Typically, they will move in and out of the most
coveted Tokyo and Osaka jobs, rotate through a series of increasingly
prestigious appointments, and cap their careers as a district court
chief judge or high (that is, intermediate appellate) court president
30
(that is, chief judge).
At the Secretariat, judges decide the personnel questions that
determine their colleagues’ careers. In doing so, they answer to the
Secretariat’s own Secretary General. The Secretary General too is a
career judge, typically in his fifties. After running the Secretariat for
several years, he will be named President of the Tokyo or Osaka High
Court (there are seven high courts, but these presidencies are the
most avidly desired). Often, he will then be appointed a justice to the
supreme court itself.
The secretary general answers to the supreme court chief justice.
Put conversely, the chief justice monitors the secretary general; the
secretary general supervises the judges staffing the Secretariat; and
the Secretariat judges make the decisions that determine the fate of
31
their peers in the lower courts.
2. Political Ties. The ruling LDP does indeed control the
Japanese lower courts. Formally, it controls the courts indirectly—
mostly through its power to appoint the fifteen supreme court
32
justices, including the administratively crucial chief justice. The LDP
controls the cabinet, after all, and the cabinet selects the fifteen
33
justices to the court. To avoid the “Harry Blackmun problem,” it
names its justices late in their lives. Appoint a forty-five-year-old
justice, after all, and risk ongoing changes in political beliefs several
times before retirement (though Justice Blackmun himself was over

29. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9,
at 9–13.
30. For a comparison of two judicial careers, see id. at 14.
31. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 53.
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sixty). To mitigate this risk, the LDP can and does appoint justices
close to their mandatory retirement at age seventy. From 1983
through 1992, it named twenty-six men to the supreme court. It
named one at age sixty, one at sixty-one, one at sixty-two, and the rest
34
between sixty-three and sixty-eight (with a mean of 64.3).
Through the Diet, the LDP can also constrain the ability of the
judges to make law. Japan maintains a parliamentary system of
government. For much of the postwar period, Japanese voters elected
enough legislators from the LDP for the party to field cabinets
35
without a coalition. If heterodox judges tried to shape the case law,
36
the party stood ready to reverse them through legislation. Even were
higher courts not to overturn the judges’ opinions on appeal (and
usually they would), the legislature could vitiate their prospective
impacts by statute.
C. Quality and Quantity
1. Quality Control. With this control, the LDP does not
primarily manipulate the political complexion of judicial opinions.
After all, most opinions have no serious political complexion to
manipulate. Instead, the LDP offers voters high quality. It routes the
rare politically loaded disputes out of the courts, and (through the
Secretariat) induces the courts to handle the remaining “ordinary”
37
cases expeditiously, intelligently, honestly, and consistently.
Japanese judges resolve most cases with dispatch. Despite having
many fewer judges per capita than the United States, the Japanese
courts decide cases at the pace of the high-quality federal courts in

32. For a detailed discussion of this and other potential mechanisms of control, see
RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 152–53, 161–81.
33. KENPÕ, art. 79; Saibansho ho [Court Act], art. 39.
34. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1882 tbl.1, 1883
tbl.2.
35. RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 19, at 19 fig.2.2.
36. See McNollgast, Conditions for Judicial Independence, 15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
105, 112 (2006) (“[T]he more closely aligned and coordinated are the political branches, the
more likely they are to agree on policy outcomes, which enables them to reduce the number of
issues on which the Court can exercise meaningful independent discretion.”).
37. This is an evaluation with which Haley apparently agrees. See Haley, supra note 15, at
120–21 (describing the effect of the “shadow of potential political intrusion” on judges). For
discussion of Haley’s work, see Frank K. Upham, Political Lackeys or Faithful Public Servants?:
Two Views of the Japanese Judiciary, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 421, 441–54 (2005).
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38

the United States. According to court insiders, the Secretariat
maintains this pace by collecting docket-clearance rates on all judges
and using them to reward and punish. Unfortunately, the rates are
not public. The (plausibly correlated) rates at which judges write
published opinions are indeed public, however, and judges who write
more publishable opinions per year do find themselves appointed to
39
the better posts.
Second, Japanese judges decide like cases similarly. Probably,
the Secretariat rewards its judges for following precedent. After all,
Japanese courts are nothing if not predictable. Curiously, however,
judges who publish opinions that are reversed on appeal do not
40
visibly suffer in their careers. In fact, though, the case reporters print
41
only a small minority of decisions, and perhaps a judge who writes
publishable opinions that are reversed on appeal is still producing
higher-quality output than a judge who publishes nothing at all.
In any event, Japanese courts work hard to maintain consistency
across opinions. The Secretariat occasionally operates workshops on
frequently litigated legal issues. And, by way of example, Daniel
Foote has nicely documented how judges deliberately engineered
42
consistency to the booming traffic-accident litigation in the 1970s.
2. The Returns to Talent. The Secretariat maintains this high
level of quality by rewarding talent. Put most pedantically, it appoints
to the most desirable posts and cities those judges who exhibit traits
most closely correlated with the diligence and intelligence necessary
to run high-quality courts. Put more colloquially, the Secretariat
rewards the smart and hard working.
Consider judicial backgrounds. Smart and hard-working judges
tend to have been smart and hard-working students. And smart and
hard-working students tend to do well on important exams. The
38. J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 140 tbl.6.1A, 141 tbl.6.1B (1999).
39. See RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9,
at 54 tbl.3.4, 67 tbl.4.2, 71 tbl.4.5, 90 tbl.5.3, 94 tbl.5.5 (describing the effects of opinion writing
on judicial careers).
40. Id. at 76–80.
41. In 2000, for example, the district courts disposed of 530,000 civil cases. See Tsujo dai
Isshinjiken no Shukyoku Sojinin [Summary Court Statistics] (2006), http://www.courts.go.jp/
sihotokei/nenpo/pdf. Based on a search in the Hanrei taikei database, the public and private
reporters together published 1452 district court opinions during that year.
42. Daniel H. Foote, Resolution of Traffic Accident Disputes and Judicial Activism in
Japan, 25 L. JAPAN 19, 24–30 (1995).
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qualities that enable students to score high on exams, in other words,
also enable them as judges to handle cases quickly and accurately.
And the judges who succeeded most prominently as students tend to
succeed most prominently in the courts.
First, the judges who attended the schools with the most selective
entrance examinations enjoy the most successful careers. They begin
at the most coveted courts. Throughout their career, they spend more
time in prestigious assignments, and more time in the desirable cities.
They climb the pay scale more rapidly. And they are more likely to
43
conclude their careers with an appointment to a Chief Judgeship.
The private market generates an analogous result. Provided they
practice in Tokyo, attorneys from the University of Tokyo earn the
highest incomes. The university has long maintained the most
restrictive entrance exam. Given the prestige of the courts, a high
fraction of judges have traditionally come from the University of
44
Tokyo. And just as University of Tokyo graduates on the bench tend
to do better than their colleagues, University of Tokyo lawyers in the
competitive private market in Tokyo tend to earn higher incomes
45
than their counterparts from other universities.
Second, the judges who passed the LRTI entrance exam most
quickly have the most successful careers. During most of the past
half-century, the passage rate on the exam hovered in the 1–3 percent
46
range. Most exam takers never passed, and the average lawyer
47
finally passed it only after first failing six or seven times. Consistent
again with the high prestige of the courts, the average judge passed it
more quickly than the average lawyer: the average judge failed it
48
“only” three to five times. But among the judges, those who failed it
fewer times started at the best courts, spent more time in prestigious

43. For a description of this point, see generally RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9.
44. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 335 tbl.1A.
45. Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Industrial Organization
of the Japanese Bar 1 (Harvard Law & Econ., Discussion Paper No. 559, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=951622.
46. See id. (manuscript at 2) (describing the LRTI exam as one “that 97–99 percent of the
applicants failed”).
47. Id. (manuscript at 8–9).
48. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 335 tbl.1A.
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posts, spent more time in desirable cities, climbed the pay scale more
49
rapidly, and more likely ended their careers as chief judges.
Again, the private market generates an analogous result.
Whether in Tokyo or the smaller cities, the lawyers who passed the
50
exam most quickly report the highest incomes later in their careers.
Passing exams requires intelligence and hard work, and those
qualities are ones that employers and clients value. Whether on the
market or in the courts, the smartest and hardest-working jurists
enjoy the most successful careers.
III. POLITICS IN THE JAPANESE LOWER COURTS
A. Structure
Institutional control over Japanese lower courts may improve
quality, but it also involves political motivations. The Secretariat does
not just manipulate incentives to promote speed and accuracy. It also
manipulates them to promote LDP policy. And precisely because the
LDP—through the Secretariat—controls crucial incentives within the
lower courts, scholars will find it hard to use the political preferences
of individual lower-court judges to predict their decisions.
Again, the controls are indirect. The LDP can appoint to the
supreme court justices who share its political philosophy. Through
that Chief Justice, it can monitor and control the Secretary General of
the Secretariat. Through the secretary general, it can set the standards
by which the Secretariat staff (judges all) reward and punish
individual lower court judges. Through those standards, it can
structure a judiciary in which the loyal do well and the heterodox
suffer. Through its control over the Diet, it can reverse by statute any
case law that a renegade judge might try to make. And because it can
do all this, the heterodox will tend to avoid careers in the courts. For
a card-carrying Marxist, a career in the Japanese courts is just not a
whole lot of fun.
In short, in Japanese lower courts, neither judicial output nor
expressed judicial preferences will show much political variation. The
case law will reflect LDP policies. The sitting judges will express LDP
policies publicly. And most of those judges will even hold LDP
policies privately. Regress the case law on potential indices of judicial
49. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 42
tbl.2.7, 53 tbl.3.3, 54 tbl.3.4, 75 tbl.4.7, 90 tbl.5.3, 92 tbl.5.4, 112 tbl.6.4.
50. Nakazato et al., supra note 45, at 17 tbl.3.
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political preference, and insignificant results will usually follow.
Although he characterizes the situation as showing independence,
Professor John Haley nicely describes the mechanics at play:
The potential for partisan or other political intervention motivates
the judges assigned to judicial administration to be more vigilant
than perhaps they might otherwise be to ensure that the judiciary
enjoys the highest levels of public trust. Thus acceptability of judges
to politicians has to be viewed in relation to the similar
accountability of politicians to the public. . . . Individual judges thus
function within the shadow of potential political intrusion. They
cannot help but be aware that in adjudicating highly publicized,
politically sensitive cases, they can be held professionally
51
accountable for their decisions.

He then concludes, “Judges themselves, however, exercise the
52
oversight, not politicians directly or indirectly.” In effect, Professor
Haley describes “indirect” but straightforward—and potentially
extremely effective—political oversight.
B. Enforcement
It was not always so. The current U.S.-imposed (formally Alliedimposed) Constitution took effect on May 3, 1947 under conservative
Shigeru Yoshida’s first cabinet. Fielding a coalition government,
Socialist Tetsu Katayama replaced him a few days later, and held
power for about ten months. In August of that year, he appointed the
53
first fifteen justices to the court.
Back in power in March 1948, Yoshida did not immediately focus
on the courts. He had other worries: inflation ran over 50 percent; the
Americans had bombed the economy back to the 1930s; his
conservative allies stood in disgrace; Allied occupiers were executing
the military elite and planning massively to purge the political and
business elite; the Americans intended to demand draconian

51. Haley, supra note 15, at 120–21; see also John O. Haley, 30 J. JAPANESE STUD. 235,
239–40 (2004) (book review) (“[T]he actions of Japan’s senior judges can be readily explained
by concern over any possible public perception of judicial corruption or incompetence or that
judges might act out of partisan preference or extreme ideological commitment.”).
52. Haley, supra note 15, at 121.
53. NIHON KINDAI SHI JITEN [DICTIONARY OF MODERN JAPANESE HISTORY] 696–702
(Kyoto daigaku bungakubu ed., 1958).
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reparations and liquidate the 500 biggest Japanese firms. With crises
like these, few prime ministers would have worried about enforcing
any orthodoxy in the courts.
Yet with the conservative government probably mandating only
haphazard conformity, some jurists on the fringe left found the courts
an attractive career. From the 1950s through the mid-1960s, a steady
stream of jurists from the Communist-affiliated Young Jurists League
(YJL) joined the courts. By 1968, about 12 percent of the incoming
55
judges were YJL members. Only as the LDP extended its hold into
the courts did leftist jurists begin to find them uncongenial.
In time, the YJL judges would suffer career penalties. As the
LDP strengthened its control over personnel matters, Professor Eric
Rasmusen and I find that the YJL judges began to be posted to
inferior positions. Talent and effort held constant, they found
themselves named to less prestigious positions, and sent to less
56
attractive cities.
When these politically heterodox judges tried to express their
personal preferences in their work, they suffered. Granted, they
seldom had reason to express those preferences. Most litigation
involved no political issues of moment. But over the politically most
sensitive disputes, the judges did have reason to indulge their politics.
And when they wrote opinions that deviated from the position held
by the LDP leadership, they suffered in their careers. For example,
Professor Rasmusen and I find penalties in the careers of judges who
1. Acquitted leftist political candidates prosecuted for violating the
57
statutory ban on door-to-door canvassing;

54. See generally Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, The Good Occupation (Harvard Law
& Econ., Discussion Paper No. 514, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=729463
(describing the general situation surrounding the Allied occupation of Japan).
55. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1886 tbl.3.
56. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at 42
tbl.2.7, 54 tbl.3.4, 90 tbl.5.3, 94 tbl.5.5, 112 tbl.6.4, 115 tbl.6.5. We also find that they climbed the
pay scale more slowly than equally qualified conservative peers. Id. at 41 tbl.2.6. But see
Kentaro Fukumoto & Mikitaka Masuyama, Judging Political Promotion of Judges: Survival
Analysis, Split Population Model and Matching Method 1–24 (2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www-cc.gakushuin.ac.jp/~e982440/research/FKMM-APSA06.pdf (arguing
that, although it is more difficult for the leftist judges to get on the track to a prestigious post,
there is no evidence of discrimination with respect to the timing of promotion once they do get
on the track).
57. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at
58–60; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Judicial Independence, supra note 9, at 283–85.
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2. Upheld apportionment-based attacks on LDP electoral victories,
58
during the years when the LDP relied on a rural base;
59

3. Upheld constitutional challenges to the Japanese military;
4. Enforced politically
60
government.

motivated

injunctions

against

the

Disproportionately, these judges spent more time during the
decade after writing the opinion in undesirable positions, and less
time in more attractive ones.
IV. 1993
61

A. Change

It was the worst of times—at least for the LDP.
After dominating politics for nearly four decades, the LDP
entered the 1990s with a wide range of problems. To pay for its lavish
pork-barrel projects, it had enacted a sales tax that alienated a broad
swath of voters. Under U.S. pressure, it had imposed trade and
investment controls that threatened key constituents. With the end of
the Cold War, it had lost any urgency to its anticommunist agenda. As
rural families migrated to the cities, it found its agricultural base
increasingly irrelevant. When its famously relaxed approach to
matters financial generated a series of bribery scandals, it lost key
leaders. And as the country spiraled into recession, it could no longer
even promise prosperity.
Within this crisis, in 1993 old rivals decided to settle scores. Onetime LDP prime-ministerial candidate Ichiro Ozawa engineered a noconfidence vote, quit the party, and organized a new organization
around his old-time protégés. In the election that followed, he and his
allies did well, while the rump LDP lost badly. The party’s rivals
regrouped around Ozawa and another renegade LDP, politician
Morihiro Hosokawa, and threw it out of power.

58. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at
68–73; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 339 tbl.2.
59. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at
64–68; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 338 tbl.1.
60. RAMSEYER & RASMUSEN, MEASURING JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, supra note 9, at
73–76; Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Japanese Judges, supra note 9, at 340 tbl.3.
61. See Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1892–93;
Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9, at 332–33.
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Championing a reformist agenda, Hosokawa took control.
Ozawa remained the kingpin, however, and even as Prime Minister
Hosokawa never escaped his influence. Within months, his coalition
unraveled. His successor (ex-LDP politician Tsutomu Hata) lasted
barely two months.
In this chaos, the Socialists struck a deal with the LDP. Their
leader, Tomiichi Murayama, became prime minister—the first
Socialist to do so since Katayama. Murayama governed through a
coalition that included the LDP, however, and even this arrangement
quickly disintegrated. He implemented little of the Socialist agenda,
and by 1996 the LDP was back in power. It has controlled the Cabinet
ever since.
Cabinets thus followed the following stages: (a) the LDP
controlled the government from 1955 through July 1993; (b)
Hosokawa, Hata, and Murayama followed in quick succession; and
(c) the LDP returned to power in January 1996. At the supreme
court: (a) Hosokawa appointed four justices; (b) Hata appointed
none; and (c) Murayama appointed five justices.
B. The Lower Courts
Elsewhere, Professor Rasmusen and I explore the effect of the
1993–96 turmoil on the lower courts. We find little to report. On the
62
one hand, the courts retained their bias against leftist judges. Some
of the YJL judges from the 1960s, for example, still served in the
courts. During the decades leading up to 1993, they endured career
penalties. Relative to their more conservative colleagues, they
languished in less prestigious posts in less desirable cities.
Much as the Hosokawa-Murayama cabinets might—
hypothetically—have tried to abolish this anti-leftist penalty, the bias
survived the 1993 crisis. Had the reformists intervened in judicial
personnel matters (or had the courts anticipated their intervention),
the courts might have changed their relative treatment of YJL and
non-YJL judges. They did not: indices of industry and intelligence
held constant, after 1993 YJL judges continued to languish in less
63
attractive posts.

62. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Case for Managed Judges, supra note 9, at 1922–25.
63. On the other hand, the post-1993 courts may have found it marginally harder to retain
and recruit the most talented jurists. If incumbent judges believed that nothing had changed in
the wake of 1993, then (economic circumstances held constant) the courts should not have
found it harder to retain them. If potential applicants believed that nothing had changed, then
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V. 1993 AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. The Issue
The anti-leftist bias in the lower courts survived the 1990s.
Apparently, the reformists did not successfully transform the courts.
But did they try?
Had the reformists wanted to change the lower courts, in part
they would have worked through the supreme court. They would
have found it hard. Although the cabinet controls the lower courts, it
primarily (not exclusively) controls them through its power to appoint
the supreme court associate justices (who police the case law through
their power to reverse) and the chief justice (who supervises the
secretary general). Not until September 1995 had the reformers
named a majority to the court. And not until November 1995 had
they named a chief justice. By January 1996, the LDP was back in
64
power.
Perhaps, however, the reformists never seriously attempted to
reform the courts. The lower courts would have changed radically
only if the reformists had appointed transformative justices to the
supreme court. Did they?
Because supreme court justices serve until mandatory retirement
at age seventy, they face few (if any) of the incentives that structure
lower court careers. Once elected—to put it most bluntly—they are
independent. Because of that independence, any political differences
among them could appear in their opinions (as is the case in the U.S.
federal courts). To test whether Hosokawa and Murayama tried to
transform the lower courts, I thus ask whether the justices they
appointed wrote different opinions from their predecessors. In
65
Section B, I first outline the work and composition of the court. I
66
then examine the opinions that the justices actually wrote, and the
67
voting patterns they exhibited.

the courts should not have found it harder to recruit talent. Yet some evidence—weak to be
sure—suggests that after 1993 the courts did find it harder to retain and recruit the most
talented jurists. Apparently, conservative jurists saw too great a risk that reformist politicians
might begin to restructure the courts to stay. Their leftist peers saw too small a chance to apply.
See generally Ramseyer & Rasmusen, Political Uncertainty’s Effect, supra note 9 (describing the
political influences on the composition of the judiciary in Japan in the 1990s).
64. ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16, at 357–58.
65. See infra Part V.B.
66. See infra Part V.C.
67. See infra Part V.D.
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B. Introduction
Consider, first, some preliminary background.
1. Workload.
a. Panels. By statute, the Japanese Supreme Court hears most
appeals in one of three five-justice panels. When a dispute raises the
constitutionality of a statute or regulation, the court handles it en
68
banc. When it concerns only legal (rather than constitutional) issues,
the court handles it on one of the three panels.
Such may be what the law requires, but the Japanese Supreme
69
Court actually hears almost no cases en banc. In 1990, it published
70
no en banc opinions at all. In 1995 it filed two and in 2000 one.
Whatever the statutory pretext, the Japanese Supreme Court disposes
of nearly all its cases through its five-justice panels.
b. Discretionary Appeals. By the terms of the Civil Procedure
Code, the supreme court’s work should have fallen dramatically in
1998. Until that year, the court heard all appeals—it exercised no
71
certiorari-like discretion to decline a case. Since 1998, it can refuse
to hear cases that raise merely legal—rather than constitutional—
72
issues. Only constitutional cases can it refuse to decline, and the data
on en banc decisions suggest such constitutional cases simply do not
exist.
But if such is what the law implies, such is not what common
sense demands. Before 1998, the court may not have had the
discretion to dismiss an appeal, but it could (and often did, I have
been assured in casual conversation) simply opine, “Affirmed for
reasons given by the court below.” After 1998 the court may have the
discretion not to hear an appeal, but it must (if it hopes to exercise
that discretion intelligently) still review an appeal to decide whether it
wants to dismiss it. Pre- or post-1998, the amount of work involved in
deciding whether to write a serious opinion should have remained
68. Saibansho ho [Court Act], Law No. 59 of 1947, art. 10.
69. I take the number of opinions from a search of the Hanrei Taikei database. The
database compiles the opinions published in all major private and public case reporters. It
remains theoretically possible that the Court published other en banc opinions that no reporter
bothered to compile. Given that most en banc Supreme Court opinions would be among the
most newsworthy opinions in courts, this is highly unlikely.
70. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court.
71. Minji sosho ho [Code of Civil Procedure], Law No. 29 of 1890, art. 394.
72. MINSOHÚ, art. 312(a), 317(b), 318.
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roughly unchanged. And pre- or post-1998, the amount of work in
actually writing the opinion about the disputes it does treat seriously
should have remained unchanged as well.
Table 1. Selected Summary Statistics
A. Opinions Published by Supreme Court
Cases with at Least One
Court Opinions
Dissent
1990
1995
2000
1990
1995
2000
76
42
56
1
1
7
Panel 1
60
56
64
3
1
1
Panel 2
67
70
54
3
0
1
Panel 3
0
2
1
0
1
1
En banc
203
168
174
7
3
10
Total
B. Appeals Filed with the Supreme Court
1990
1995
3109
4219
Civil & Adm
1913
1858
Criminal
5022
6077
Total

Concurrence
1990
1995
0
0
1
0
2
5
0
1
3
6

2000
3
4
3
0
10

2000
6476
2901
9377

C. Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court
Predecessor
Career
Justice
Appointed Age University
Career
Hosokawa Cabinet
Hideo Chigusa
9/93
61
Tokyo U
Judge
Judge
Shigeharu Negishi
1/94
61
Tokyo U
Prosecutor
Prosecutor
Hisako Takahashi
2/94
66
Tokyo U
Bureaucrat
Bureaucrat
Yukinobu Ozaki
2/94
64
Tokyo U
Lawyer
Lawyer
Murayama Cabinet
Shin’ichi Kaai
7/94
62
Kyoto U
Lawyer
Lawyer
Mitsuo Endo
2/95
64
Hosei U
Lawyer
Lawyer
Kazutomo Ijima
8/95
62
N.A.
Prosecutor
Prosecutor
Hiroshi Fukuda
9/95
60
Tokyo U
Bureaucrat
Bureaucrat
Masao Fujii
11/95
63
Kyoto U
Judge
Judge
Sources: Hanrei taikei [Case Compendium] (Tokyo: Daiichi hoki, updated);
Saiko saibansho jimuso kyoku, ed., Shiho tokei nempo [Legal Statistics
Annual] (Tokyo: Hosokai, various years); Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai,
ed., Zen saibankan keireki soran [Overview of Careers of All Japanese
Judges] (Tokyo: Nihon minshu horitsuka kyokai, 4th ed., 2004).

And indeed, the number of cases in which the court writes a
serious opinion has stayed approximately constant. From 1990 to
1995, litigants increased the number of appeals they filed by about 20
percent. From 1995 to 2000, they increased it by over 50 percent.
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Despite the fact that the court had new legal authority to refuse their
73
appeals, they filed half again as many appeals.
Table 2. Opinions by LDP and Reformist Justices: All Panels
A. Summary Statistics

Appointed by:
LDP
Hosokawa
Murayama
Background:
Lawyer
Prosecutor
Judge
Other background
B. Regressions
Dependent
Variable
LDP Appointee
Lawyer
Prosecutor
Other backgrd
Decisions
Adj. R2

n

Mean Maj.
Ops.

Mean
Dissents

Mean
Concur.

Private
Reporter %

All Off’l
Reporters %

28
4
5

161.14
173.25
191.40

1.43
1.25
1.60

1.36
1.50
1.80

9.46
6.32
2.84

69.47
72.36
62.36

13
5
12
7

159.46
178.60
163.33
176.57

2.38
.40
.75
1.57

1.62
1.20
.92
2.14

8.21
5.64
9.45
8.00

68.91
67.73
70.31
66.88

(1) Total
Dissents
-.099 (0.17)
1.658 (2.60)**
-.317 (0.39)
.863 (1.18)
-.001 (0.18)
.13

(2) Total
Concur.
-.333 (0.46)
.359 (0.46)
.049 (0.05)
1.012 (1.12)
-.008 (0.94)
-.08

(3) Total
Private Rptr.
7.397 (3.10)***
-.440 (0.17)
-2.997 (0.91)
-.756 (0.26)
.042 (1.43)
.17

(4) Total Official
Rptr.
3.292 (0.74)
-3.480 (0.73)
-3.754 (0.61)
-5.078 (0.93)
.674 (12.33)***
.83

Dependent Variable
Dissent %
Concur. %
Priv. Rptr. %
.017 (0.05)
.219 (0.33)
4.405 (2.97)***
LDP Appointee
1.146 (3.06)***
.810 (1.15)
.159 (0.10)
Lawyer
-.173 (0.35)
.156 (0.17)
-1.671 (0.80)
Prosecutor
.678 (1.54)
.742 (0.90)
.190 (0.10)
Other backgrd
.21
-.07
.17
Adj. R2
Notes: The regressions include the 37 justices appointed between 1983 and

Off’l Rptr. %
2.351 (0.79)
-1.366 (0.43)
-2.148 (0.51)
-3.262 (0.87)
-.08
1995 other

than the two Chief Justices (who have greater administrative responsibilities). For each
Justice, I include all opinions published during his or her first three years on the bench.
“Official Reporter” figures include all opinions published in any official reporter.
“Private Reporter” figures include those opinions published in either of the two
principal private reporters (Hanrei jiho or Hanrei taimuzu) but not in an official
reporter.
For appointments, the omitted variable is an appointment by one of the two reformist
cabinets. For the background variables, the omitted variable is a background as a
career judge.
n = 35. *, **, ***: significant at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. All
regressions include a constant term.
Regressions are OLS, with t-statistics in parenthesis.
Sources: See Table 1.

73. See infra Table 1, Panel B: Appeals Filed with the Supreme Court.
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In fact, however, the court did not substantially change the
number of serious opinions it issued. In 1990, it published about 200
cases (some of those very short). It published about 170 in 1995, and
74
about 170 in 2000. The number of appeals filed may have risen—but
the number of opinions published stayed about the same.
c. Dissents. Supreme court justices rarely write dissenting or
concurring opinions. Lower court judges never do, but even supreme
court justices write them only rarely. Of the 168 opinions in 1995, only
75
three included any dissents. Of the 174 opinions in 2000, only 10 did.
What is more, the justices who did not come from careers in the
lower courts or prosecutorial offices wrote most of the dissents. Of
the thirty-seven justices appointed between 1983 and 1995, the former
lawyers wrote a mean 2.38 dissents and 1.62 concurrences during their
first three years on the bench; the former prosecutors wrote a mean
0.40 dissents and 1.20 concurrences, and the former lower-court
76
judges wrote a mean 0.75 dissents and 0.92 concurrences.
2. Background Careers.
The reformist governments of
Hosokawa and Murayama appointed justices with the same
backgrounds as did their predecessors. Fundamentally, they
continued the customary (but not legally mandated) practice of
maintaining professional slots. Justices who came from the
professional judiciary they replaced with other professional judges.
Former prosecutors they replaced with other prosecutors. And career
77
lawyers they replaced with other lawyers.
A government intent on changing the political complexion of the
courts would have done otherwise. Under the nearly four-decadelong LDP rule, jurists sharing LDP policy preferences
disproportionately would have self-selected into the bureaucracy and
the courts. Those with opposition sympathies would have taken (and
did take) jobs in the bar or on university faculties. A reformist hoping
to stack the court with like-minded judges would thus have named
more lawyers or professors. Neither Hosokawa nor Murayama did
78
so.

74. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court.
75. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court.
76. See infra Table 2, Panel A: Summary Statistics. For statistical significance, see infra
Table 2, Panel B: Regressions.
77. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court.
78. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court.
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3. Age at Appointment. Had the reformists hoped to extend their
influence in the courts beyond their expected tenure, they would have
appointed young justices. American Presidents do this routinely, of
course. John Roberts Jr. was fifty when appointed in 2005; Samuel
Alito was fifty-five when appointed in 2006. Even Socialist Katayama
in 1947 appointed some justices as young as fifty-three (the mean age
79
was fifty-nine).
Hosokawa and Murayama did not do this. Hosokawa appointed
his four at a mean age of 63.0 (range 61–66), and Murayama his five
80
at 62.2 (range 60–64). Given that supreme court justices face
mandatory retirement at age seventy, all Hosokawa-Murayama
appointees were gone by 2005.
4. University Background. University background says nothing
about politics. Among University of Tokyo alumni, reformist prime
ministers could have chosen either capitalists or communists. The
University of Tokyo regularly sends its graduates to the bureaucracy
and the exchange-listed corporate ranks. But it counts many Marxists
among its faculty and alumni as well—even the chair (as of late 2008)
of the Japan Communist Party Central Committee, Kazuo Shii.
In any event, Hosokawa and Murayama continued the
meritocratic emphasis of their predecessors. Hosokawa chose all of
his justices from the University of Tokyo. Of the four appointees on
whom university background is public, Murayama took one from the
University of Tokyo and two from its close competitor, the University
81
of Kyoto.
C. Opinions Published
In Panel B of Table 2, I ask whether the reformist-appointed
justices wrote different opinions than their LDP-appointed colleagues
did. Again, I take the thirty-seven justices named between 1983 and
1995: twenty-eight were appointed by LDP prime ministers, four by
Hosokawa, and five by Murayama. Because of their greater
administrative workload, I exclude the two chief justices. For each
justice, I examine the opinions they published during his first three
years on the bench.

79. See ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16.
80. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court.
81. See infra Table 1, Panel C: Reformist Appointees to the Supreme Court.
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In Column (1), I regress the number of dissents individual
justices published against the cabinet that appointed them (the
omitted category is appointment by Hosokawa or Murayama). I add
additional variables for their professional backgrounds (the omitted
category is judge) and the total number of decisions in which they
participated.
If the reformist-appointed justices decided cases differently than
their LDP colleagues, they should have written more dissents (after
all, they were in the minority during the first post-1993 years). They
did not: the coefficient on LDP appointment is insignificantly
different from 0. In a second set of regressions, I use as dependent
variable the percentage (rather than number) of dissents a justice
wrote (among his total output). The coefficient on LDP remains
insignificant: reformist-appointed justices did not dissent more often
than their predecessors.
The LDP justices would have dominated the court most strongly
during the first years of the Hosokawa administration. After all, they
constituted the largest block during those early years. In other
regressions (not reported), I disaggregate the Hosokawa and
Murayama justices, and ask whether the former were most likely to
dissent. They were not.
In Column (2), I regress the number of concurrences (and
percentage of concurrences) against a justice’s appointing cabinet.
Again, the coefficient on LDP appointment is insignificant: the
reformist appointees did not write more concurrences than the LDP
appointees.
The private case reporters print opinions their publishers find
newsworthy, while the official reporters print opinions selected by
Secretariat staff. During the reformist cabinets, lower-court judges
hired during the LDP years still controlled the Secretariat. Suppose
reformist-appointed justices wrote opinions that flouted LDP
preferences. If they did, the major private reporters would have found
them newsworthy, while the official reporters would have hesitated to
grant them their imprimatur.
In Column (3) I take as my dependent variable the number of
opinions published in at least one of the two principal private
reporters (Hanrei taimuzu or Hanrei jiho) but not in any of the
official reporters. I then regress this count against the party that
appointed the justice. Curiously, the coefficient on LDP-appointment
is significantly positive: the LDP appointed justices were more likely
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than their reformist colleagues to have opinions published by the
major private but not official reporters.
In Column (4), I regress the number of opinions published in an
official reporter against the party that appointed the justice. The
coefficient on the justice’s appointing party is insignificant: LDPappointed justices were no more likely than their reformist colleagues
to obtain the imprimatur of official publication.
D. Voting Alignments
If the reformist-appointed justices brought a distinctive policy
perspective to their work, they should have tended to vote as a block.
Disproportionately, they should have voted with each other and
against their LDP-appointed colleagues.
To explore this hypothesis, in Table 3 I take all twelve en banc
opinions published between January 1, 1993 and December 31, 2002
that included a dissenting or concurring opinion. As Panel A shows,
both the LDP and the “reform” blocks of justices routinely split their
votes. In general, a justice appointed by Hosokawa or Murayama
seems as likely to have voted with the LDP justices as with the other
Hosokawa-Murayama appointees.
In Panel B, I report the correlation coefficients (and p-values)
for a given justice’s vote and the percentage of other LDP-appointed
82
or reform-appointed justices voting in the same direction. According
to Panel B.1, any given LDP justice’s vote may be more strongly
correlated with the votes of the reformist-appointed justices than with
the other LDP appointees. According to Panel B.2, the correlation
coefficients between any reformist-appointee’s vote and the
percentage of LDP-appointees and reform-appointees voting in the
same direction are indistinguishable.

82. For example, the correlation coefficient between a given LDP appointee’s vote for the
majority and the percentage of other LDP justices who voted for the majority was -.04
(p value = .7). The correlation coefficient between his vote for the dissent and the percentage of
other LDP justices who voted for the dissent is -.05 (p value = .6). The discrepancy between the
two correlation matrices comes from the fact that the percentages are of the other LDP justices,
not all LDP justices. A concurrence is counted as a vote for the majority.
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Table 3. Opinions by LDP and Reformist Justices: En Banc Panels
A. Summary Statistics
Hanrei taikei ID
LDP Justices
Number
28020801
6
28011240
6
28011109
6
27827501
9
28072380
12
28060668
10
28060669
10
28051944
9
28042712
9
28042663
8
28042637
8
28033415
8
B. Correlation Matrices
1. LDP Appointed Justices
Majority
Other
vote
LDP
maj. %
1.00
Majority
vote
-.04 (.70)
1.00
Other
LDP
maj. %
.25 (.01)
.57 (.00)
Reform
maj. %
2. Reform Appointed Justices
Majority
LDP
vote
maj. %

Reform Justices
9
9
9
6
3
5
5
6
6
6
6
7

Reform
maj. %

1.00

Oth.
Reform
maj. %

LDP Majority
votes
4
5
6
7
12
8
6
7
9
6
6
6

Dissent
vote
Dissent
vote
Other
LDP
diss. %
Reform
diss.%

Reform Majority
votes
9
4
9
3
3
4
3
3
6
3
3
4

Oth.
LDP
diss. %

Reform
diss. %

1.00
-.05 (.61)

1.00

.25 (.01)

.57 (.00)

Dissent
vote

LDP
diss. %

1.00

Oth.
Ref.
diss. %

1.00
1.00
Majority
Dissent
vote
vote
.23 (.04)
1.00
.23 (.04)
1.00
LDP
LDP
maj. %
diss. %
.23 (.04)
.37 (.00)
1.00
.40 (.00)
1.00
Oth. Ref.
Oth. Ref. .24 (.04)
maj. %
diss. %
Notes: The dataset includes all en banc decisions published between January 1, 1993
and December 31, 2002 that included either a dissenting or a concurring opinion.
P-values in parentheses.
Sources: See Table 1.

E. Significance
1. Introduction. The reformist-appointed justices did not write
more dissents. They did not write opinions that the commercial press
found unusually newsworthy. They did not write opinions that
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Secretariat editors shunned. They did not vote as a block.
The data tell us all this. But they do not tell us why. In this
regard, consider the following four possibilities.
2. Judicial Ideology. At one level, the data suggest that the
justices (both LDP and reformist) may see their job as voting the law.
Indulging their political preferences they perhaps think illegitimate. If
they shun politics and follow the law, the results above follow.
And at some level, the point is surely true. The Japanese public
sees a judge’s job as enforcing the law. Probably, so do the judges.
For a United States–Japan comparison, however, the point is
also irrelevant. Like Japanese voters, American voters (other than
law professors, one is tempted to add) similarly see the judicial job as
83
that of voting the law. So does Judge Harry Edwards. When he
writes what he does, he confirms an ethic as deeply held in the United
States as in Japan. Many Japanese judges do indeed see political
judging as improper—but so do many American judges.
3. Strategic Voting. The Justices’ public votes may also reflect
private log-rolls. Rather than reflect their true preferences, the votes
justices cast in public could also reflect the deals they cut in private.
Because the deals involve multiple opinions (“You vote my way on
this case; I’ll vote your way on the other”), how justices vote in any
84
one case may say little about what they actually prefer.
This “strategic voting” could easily lie behind the hundreds of
85
unanimous five-judge panel cases. Opinionated jurists do routinely
disagree, after all—even in Japan, and even on nonpolitical questions.
Poll any five jurists even from the same political party on any 174
random legal questions, and they will seldom agree on 164.
Whatever the case in the five-judge panel cases, the justices in
86
the en banc cases are not cutting their deals within political blocks.
Instead, if they make any explicit or implicit trades, they seem to

83. See For Republicans, Judicial Appointments Matter More than Iraq, RASMUSSEN
REPORTS, May 21, 2008, http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/election_
20082/2008_presidential_election/for_republicans_judicial_appointments_matter_more_than_ir
aq.
84. As a normative matter, vote trading on the bench is roundly condemned. E.g., Evan H.
Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297,
2333–79 (1999).
85. See infra Table 1, Panel A: Opinions Published by the Supreme Court.
86. See infra Table 3, Panel A: Summary Statistics.
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make them on their own. After all, in most of these cases they split
their votes within both the LDP and the reformist blocks. Just as
87
legislative vote trading most often occurs within political parties, one
might expect vote trading on the court to occur among ideological
compatriots. At least in the en banc cases of the Japanese Supreme
Court, however, that apparently does not occur: if justices swap votes,
they swap them individually.
4. Bland Cases. Bear in mind that Japanese courts do not handle
as politically charged a set of disputes as the courts in the United
States. Japanese courts have not been as receptive to “innovative”
claims as some American courts, and—as a result—litigants have not
88
been as eager to bring them. This is endogenous to the character of
the judges. As long as the LDP appointed the justices and they in turn
managed the lower courts, politically inclined disputants justifiably
89
saw the courts as unreceptive. Once Hosokawa and Murayama
began appointing justices, however, they might have begun to
consider bringing more of the claims we see in the United States.
For the voting patterns in Table 3, however, all this is as
irrelevant as it is true. The cases in Table 3 are not a random sample
of cases. Instead, they are the cases heard en banc. By definition, they
are the politically most highly charged disputes of all: cases in which
one of the parties challenged the constitutionality of a statute or
regulation. Judicial hostility to political litigation may help explain
why the court hears so few disputes en banc. It does not explain why
the justices voted as they did in the few cases they did hear en banc.
5. Tenuous Hold. Fundamentally, however, perhaps Hosokawa
and Murayama never tried to change the character of the courts. As a
LDP politician who had only recently quit the party, Hosokawa did
not hold radically different policy preferences from his predecessors.
Neither did the other politicians in his coalition. As a Socialist,

87. E.g., Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns of Congressional Voting, 35 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 228, 265 (1991) (observing that the “maintenance of party coalitions apparently puts
considerable constraint on the extent of internal party dissent”).
88. As Professor John Haley put it, “the justices have tended to defer to the political
branches of government and the political process rather than craft constitutional mandates
themselves.” JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 178 (1998).
89. In the LDP years, a “political” claim would tend to have been brought by an opposition
litigant, if only because LDP supporters would have been more likely to enact their policy
preferences in the Diet. Opposition supporters litigated because they found their legislative
options foreclosed.
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Murayama did hold other preferences, but he governed through a
90
coalition that included the LDP. Within this coalition, he negotiated
from a fundamentally weak position. In the July 1993 lower house
election, the LDP had captured 223 of the 511 seats. His Socialists
91
had taken only seventy.
Whatever the reason, Hosokawa and Murayama apparently put
judicial change on low priority. Murayama probably lacked the power
to push through change without jeopardizing other aspects of his
program; Hosokawa may not even have wanted to change the courts.
Both premiers apparently focused their attention elsewhere. They
could not solidly have altered the courts except through supreme
court appointments. But they had not finally appointed a majority of
the justices until September 1995, and had not appointed the
92
administratively crucial Chief Justice until November 1995. Two
months later, the LDP re-took control.
Given what Hosokawa and Murayama did (that is, given what
they did not do), it stands to reason that the lower courts would not
have changed. Given the tenuous reformist hold on government,
jurists interested in radical change would have hesitated to join the
courts. The government could not credibly have assured them a stable
career, even had it tried. For the same reason, sitting judges with
reformist preferences would have hesitated to shift their behavior
toward reformist positions. The LDP could return, after all—as it
soon did. The resurgent conservatives in the courts could then punish
them in their careers, and the conservatives in the Diet would reverse
their case law by statute.
And even had Murayama hoped to change policy fundamentally,
perhaps he would not have worked through the courts anyway.
Rather than manipulate the courts, perhaps he tried to implement the

90. See ANDREW GORDON, A MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM TOKUGAWA TIMES TO
PRESENT 323–24 (2d ed. 2009). Murayama abandoned two long-time Socialist positions—
opposition to the Self-Defense Force and the defense treaty with the United States—
immediately upon taking office. See Haruhiro Fukui & Shigeko N. Fukai, Japan in 1996:
Between Hope and Uncertainty, 37 ASIA SURVEY 20, 26 (1997).
91. See GORDON, supra note 90, at 323 (explaining that the Socialists considered forming a
coalition with the LDP as “a last best chance to share power”).
92. On the tenure of the justices, see ZEN SAIBANKAN KEIREKI SORAN, supra note 16, at
357. Of course, the appointment of the chief justice himself was not indispensable. A prime
minister intent on controlling the lower courts could privately assure a sitting Secretary General
that he (the Secretary General) would be appointed to the supreme court on the next vacancy if
but only if he administered the Secretariat in ways that implemented the prime minister’s
political agenda.
THE
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Socialist agenda by statute. Perhaps he tried to shift the large
bureaucratic apparatus (stacked with three decades of LDP
appointees). And within the bureaucracy, perhaps he focused on
93
those ministries most central to his Socialist reform. Among the
ministries, the Ministry of Justice was most closely tied to the courts.
Apparently, however, it was not a ministry about which he much
cared. Over the course of his short tenure, he cycled three men
94
through the minister of justice slot. All three were LDP politicians.
More basically, perhaps Hosokawa and Murayama thought they
could shift the equilibrium in the lower court from political control to
political independence. Suppose, for instance, that they thought they
had ushered in an era of alternating political control. After all, writes
historian Andrew Gordon, “in 1993, most observers predicted
movement toward a two-party system. They expected a coherent rival
95
to the LDP would emerge.” If so, perhaps the two dominant parties
could choose mutually to keep their hands off the courts as a way of
96
minimizing their losses while out of power. And in Japan, keeping
their hands off the lower courts would necessarily entail a nonpolitical
97
approach to supreme court appointments.
In the United States, though the Democrat and Republican
governments politicize the judicial appointments process, they do
keep sitting federal judges independent of themselves. By keeping the
courts mutually independent, they reduce the political cost of
electoral defeat. Because they expect to lose elections from time to

93. Consistent with that principle, he did save the Cabinet Secretariat, the Management &
Coordination Agency, the Ministry of Labor, and the Ministry of Health & Welfare for Socialist
politicians. Beyond those posts, though, he seems mostly to have focused on pork. At various
times, he assigned Socialist politicians to the post office, the Ministry of Construction, and the
Ministry of Land and Infrastructure.
94. Shigeto Nagano, the first justice minister, began his political career as a member of the
LDP in the House of Councillors. See Profiles of Coalition Cabinet Ministers; Justice Minister:
Shigeto Nagano, DAILY YOMIURI, Apr. 29, 1994, at 4. His successor, Tomoharu Tazawa, was a
LDP member and the chairman of the upper house Rules and Administration Committee of the
House of Councillors. See Profiles of Ministers in New Murayama Cabinet, DAILY YOMIURI,
Aug. 9, 1995, at 5. Similarly, Tazawa’s successor, Hiroshi Miyazawa was a LDP House of
Councillor member. See Tazawa Resigns as Justice Minister; Miyazawa Appointed as Successor,
DAILY YOMIURI, Oct. 10, 1995, at 1.
95. GORDON, supra note 90, at 323.
96. See GINSBURG, supra note 14, at 21–33; Hanssen, supra note 14, at 712; Ramseyer,
supra note 14, at 741–42.
97. In the United States, the parties can politicize judicial appointments while still keeping
the judicial administration politically independent. In Japan, the internal structure of the courts
makes that distinction much harder to make.
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time, they find the hands-off-the-courts strategy mutually beneficial.
By contrast, the Japanese LDP had not kept the lower courts
independent—but neither had it expected to lose power. If Hosokawa
and Murayama thought that Japanese parties would begin to
98
alternate in power, perhaps they hoped to shift the equilibrium in
the lower courts from nonindependence to independence. Toward
that end, perhaps they deliberately kept their hands off the courts. If
this was in fact their calculation, they were wrong ex post—but that
fact does not itself render the strategy necessarily irrational ex ante.
CONCLUSION
Japanese Supreme Court justices enjoy an institutional
independence that their lower-court brethren lack. Lower-court
judges work within a career structure that rewards them for following
the political preferences of the long-time ruling LDP. That LDP
briefly lost power in the mid-1990s, but for the lower-court judges
little changed.
Had the reformist premiers who temporarily replaced the LDP
in the 1990s hoped to change the courts, they would have begun with
the appointments to the supreme court. As the LDP-appointed
justices retired, they would have named jurists who shared their
reformist instincts. Precisely because of the institutional
independence of the court, those changed appointments would have
generated changed opinions: the new justices with reformist policy
preferences would have written opinions different from those of their
LDP predecessors.
Yet the reformist-appointed justices did not write different
opinions. They did not write more dissents. They did not write more
newsworthy decisions. They did not write opinions that antagonized
Secretariat editors. And they did not vote as a block. Apparently, the
reformist premiers did not appoint justices with different political
preferences from their predecessors.

98. See GORDON, supra note 90, at 323.

